Saturday, February 07, 2004
Perhaps We Need Salutes?
The fuss about whether or not Pres. Bush, or his administration, did or did not say the words "imminent threat" in regard to Iraq indicates that we failed to resolve an issue in the Fall of 2002 when Congress passed the Iraq resolution.
You will recall that opponents of the resolution asserted that Iraq was not an "imminent threat" and thus no military action should be taken. Sen. Carl Levin comes to mind as possibly the first to prominently use the phrase. The administration's counter was that "imminent threat" was the wrong standard for when the United States should act, a view later summarized in Pres. Bush's State of the Union address in January 2003:
" Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."
I am not sure we know when a threat is "imminent", but if it need not be "imminent" before we act what is the standard?
Take for instance Japan and the United States at the beginning of our entry into WWII. Clearly we had to act when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Positing our knowledge of the location and actions of the Japanese, should we have acted when the Japanese carriers launched aircraft near Pearl Harbor?? When the carriers passed some magical line, say 200 miles from Hawaii? When they sailed from Japan? When we intercepted Japanese messages detailing the defenses at Pearl Harbor? When Japan left the Washington Conference Treaty in 1937 and began to build up its naval power?
The problem is that even if one were to have a very clear idea of physical facts -- military movements, weapons programs, readiness states -- the only definitive evidence is likely to be in a secret coded operational order that marries intent with capabilities. Our intelligence did not do well on the physical facts in Iraq, let alone intent. Indeed, the entirety of our last hundred years of history suggests that our intelligence has never been good prior to war on the issue of intent, and only somewhat better on the issue of physical facts.
From the 16th century into the 19th century, there was a somewhat similar problem in Europe. Naval ships had the ability to circumnavigate the globe, and were becoming instruments of power projection able to attack increasingly important commerce and colonies. Communications had not significantly progressed.
As a result the visit of a ship to a foreign port was ambiguous. Was the ship, traveling as fast as news, aware that war had been declared while forts at the harbor mouth were not? Was it a friendly visit, or would it once past the fort guarding the mouth of the harbor begin to bombard the town. Similarly, when two ships meteachat sea, captain grappled with the question of whether the opposing ship had more recent news of peace or war than he did.
The history of the period has a number of incidents of mistaken engagements: ships at peace fighting one another, one ship gaining advantage over another because it knew war had been declared, colonies seized after the cessation of hostilities and so forth.
To reduce the problem the European powers came up with a series of formalisms. The salute was one. A ship meeting another ship or entering a harbor with a military installation would salute the foreign flag by firing its cannon. Given the extensive time to reload early in the naval cannon's history, and the short effective range of cannon, the salute was a very clear statement that "I am now rendered harmless".
Though relying on a code of behavior rather than physical constraints, the later custom of flying the flag of the country possessing a port when entering the port, was a similar statement. It was more or less a gentleman's statement that "we are not at war".
Perhaps we need something similar today. In the age of WMD, an obvious possibility is weapons inspection. Of course, that assumes that the failure to allow adequate inspection would itself be a casus belli.
The fuss about whether or not Pres. Bush, or his administration, did or did not say the words "imminent threat" in regard to Iraq indicates that we failed to resolve an issue in the Fall of 2002 when Congress passed the Iraq resolution.
You will recall that opponents of the resolution asserted that Iraq was not an "imminent threat" and thus no military action should be taken. Sen. Carl Levin comes to mind as possibly the first to prominently use the phrase. The administration's counter was that "imminent threat" was the wrong standard for when the United States should act, a view later summarized in Pres. Bush's State of the Union address in January 2003:
" Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."
I am not sure we know when a threat is "imminent", but if it need not be "imminent" before we act what is the standard?
Take for instance Japan and the United States at the beginning of our entry into WWII. Clearly we had to act when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Positing our knowledge of the location and actions of the Japanese, should we have acted when the Japanese carriers launched aircraft near Pearl Harbor?? When the carriers passed some magical line, say 200 miles from Hawaii? When they sailed from Japan? When we intercepted Japanese messages detailing the defenses at Pearl Harbor? When Japan left the Washington Conference Treaty in 1937 and began to build up its naval power?
The problem is that even if one were to have a very clear idea of physical facts -- military movements, weapons programs, readiness states -- the only definitive evidence is likely to be in a secret coded operational order that marries intent with capabilities. Our intelligence did not do well on the physical facts in Iraq, let alone intent. Indeed, the entirety of our last hundred years of history suggests that our intelligence has never been good prior to war on the issue of intent, and only somewhat better on the issue of physical facts.
From the 16th century into the 19th century, there was a somewhat similar problem in Europe. Naval ships had the ability to circumnavigate the globe, and were becoming instruments of power projection able to attack increasingly important commerce and colonies. Communications had not significantly progressed.
As a result the visit of a ship to a foreign port was ambiguous. Was the ship, traveling as fast as news, aware that war had been declared while forts at the harbor mouth were not? Was it a friendly visit, or would it once past the fort guarding the mouth of the harbor begin to bombard the town. Similarly, when two ships meteachat sea, captain grappled with the question of whether the opposing ship had more recent news of peace or war than he did.
The history of the period has a number of incidents of mistaken engagements: ships at peace fighting one another, one ship gaining advantage over another because it knew war had been declared, colonies seized after the cessation of hostilities and so forth.
To reduce the problem the European powers came up with a series of formalisms. The salute was one. A ship meeting another ship or entering a harbor with a military installation would salute the foreign flag by firing its cannon. Given the extensive time to reload early in the naval cannon's history, and the short effective range of cannon, the salute was a very clear statement that "I am now rendered harmless".
Though relying on a code of behavior rather than physical constraints, the later custom of flying the flag of the country possessing a port when entering the port, was a similar statement. It was more or less a gentleman's statement that "we are not at war".
Perhaps we need something similar today. In the age of WMD, an obvious possibility is weapons inspection. Of course, that assumes that the failure to allow adequate inspection would itself be a casus belli.
